On September 12, 2004, a 24-year-old female career fire fighter (the victim) died while conducting an initial attack at a wildland fire. A Helitack crew responded in a helicopter to a wildland fire in a remote river drainage with slopes ranging from 80 to 120 percent. The crew began constructing an indirect downhill handline from a forest service road in an attempt to establish an anchor point at the river. A wind shift caused the fire to make an upslope run into the crew. Four crew members ran downhill toward the river while the victim and another fire fighter ran uphill toward another crew member standing on the road. The victim was overrun by fire and later pronounced dead at the scene.
On September 12, 2004, a 24-year-old female career fire fighter (the victim) died while conducting an initial attack at a wildland fire. A Helitack crew responded in a helicopter to a wildland fire in a remote river drainage with slopes ranging from 80 to 120 percent. The crew began constructing an indirect downhill handline from a forest service road in an attempt to establish an anchor point at the river. A wind shift caused the fire to make an upslope run into the crew. Four crew members ran downhill toward the river while the victim and another fire fighter ran uphill toward another crew member standing on the road. The victim was overrun by fire and later pronounced dead at the scene.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments and fire service agencies should • ensure that crews are able to reach a safety zone(s) quickly when deciding to construct a downhill/indirect handline in steep terrain.
The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention
Program is conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose of the program is to determine factors that cause or contribute to fire fighter deaths suffered in the line of duty. Identification of causal and contributing factors enable researchers and safety specialists to develop strategies for preventing future similar incidents. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters. A glossary of terms used in this report is included as an appendix to this report.
Training and Experience
The victim was a fire fighter who had approximately 4 fire seasons of wildland fire fighting experience with an engine crew and 6 months of experience with this Helitack crew. The fire was under the Command of the USFS.
Fire
The fire was approximately 5-10 acres in size at the time Copter 404 flew over the incident scene as part of the crew's size-up of the fire and terrain.
Nothing of concern was noted by the crew upon initial size-up. The fire spread in light, flashy surface fuels at the time of the initial attack with a majority of the fire above the forest service road heading toward the ridgeline (Photo 1). Smoke was blowing lightly up canyon and obscured the left flank of the fire. No spot fires were observed at this time.
Fuels
The fuels were predominately oak, mixed brush, leaf litter, and light grass with an oak overstory consistent with Fuel Model 2. The surface fuel layer consisted of oak leaf and pine needle litter and sparse, short, discontinuous cured annual grasses less than 12 inches in height.
One-hour fine fuel moisture was estimated to be 4-5%. 1 Live fuel moisture values at the incident site were estimated to be 61% and 71% for Chamise and Manzanita respectively. Note: Fuel moisture levels of 60% for Chamise and 80% for Manzanita are often designated as the "critical" fuel moistures for these fuels.
Weather
The temperature ranged from 89-94 degrees Fahrenheit with a relative humidity (RH) of 18-24%. The wind was predominantly steady and up-canyon (out of the west-southwest), estimated to be 3-5 miles per hour.
Ground and air crews reported that the wind remained light and was flowing steadily in an up-canyon direction with no critical fire weather patterns (thunderstorms, frontal passages, etc.) prior to or during the fatal event.
Topography
The incident site was located in a major river drainage in the Sierra Nevada range at an elevation of 1,450 feet. The topography in the river canyon is best characterized as having steep, rugged, broken terrain with numerous tributary canyons and ridges with slopes ranging from 80-120 percent. The incident site was located on a west facing slope of 90 percent at the bottom of the river canyon. continued east on the forest service road to verify their position in relation to a bridge further up river and to find an access point to the river from the road. They did not find an access point to the river. The two fire fighters returned and met up with the crew at the incident site. Captain #2 then hiked down the hill as part of his size-up and returned to inform the crew that the distance to the river was approximately 300 feet. He identified the safety zones as the forest service road and the river. Captain #2 then decided that an indirect attack would help to keep the crew out of the heat, smoke, and heavy brush and would allow his crew to leave the backpack pumps on the road. The crew was briefed by Captain #2 on the situation and asked if there were any concerns about their assignment. No concerns were voiced by the crew. Captain #2 directed the fire fighters to leave the backpack pumps (full of water) on the forest service road. Captain #2 radioed Captain #1 in Copter 404 and advised him that the Helitack crew would be building a downhill handline on the right flank of the fire. Note: The
IC did not hear this radio transmission as it is believed that the IC was on the command channel at this time ordering additional resources.
At approximately 1340 hours, Engine 43 (E-43) arrived at the campground and met with the IC. The IC informed the E-43 Captain that there was a Helitack crew working the right flank of the fire and instructed the Captain to support them.
The Helitack crew began constructing the indirect handline, beginning at the forest service road (approximately 260 feet above the river), in an attempt to establish an anchor point at the river (Diagram and Photo 1). The crew's handline was approximately 6 to 30 feet from the fire's edge, downhill in an oak overstory with brush fuels (Photo 2). The fire was backing into an upcanyon wind with flame lengths of approximately 6 to 12-inches. The sawyer (Fire Fighter #4) and his swamper (Fire Fighter #5) were the first down the hill clearing brush while the rest of the crew followed them, constructing the handline (Diagram).
At approximately 1342 hours, the E-43 Captain had the driver spot the apparatus along the road just to the west of the Helitack crew. The E-43 Captain and a fire fighter proceeded on foot toward the incident site.
Captain #2 directed Fire Fighter #2 to burn-out the fuel between the fire's edge and the handline. A number of factors contributed to the fatal event. The factors include, but are not limited to, the steep terrain (difficulty in reaching safety zones up a 90% slope in a timely manner), the sudden change in wind direction, the unburned fuel between the handline and the fire, and available resources (Copter 404 and Engine 43) in the area that were not utilized in support of establishing the handline and an anchor point at the river.
INJURIES
Helitack Captain -minor burns to the face. Fire Fighter #2 -smoke inhalation. Fire Fighter #3 -small second degree burn to left wrist and a small second degree burn to nose.
CAUSE OF DEATH
The autopsy report listed the cause of death as inhalation of products of combustion.
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Fire departments and fire service agencies should ensure that crews are able to reach a safety zone(s) quickly when deciding to construct a downhill/indirect handline in steep terrain.
Discussion: Downhill handline construction is hazardous in steep terrain, fast-burning fuels, or rapidly changing weather. Downhill handline construction should not be attempted unless there is no tactical alternative. Direct attack methods should be used whenever possible. and fireline overhead will discuss assignments prior to committing crew(s), a qualified overhead individual will stay with job until completed, the decision will be made after proposed handline has been scouted by supervisor(s) of involved crew(s), and lookouts, communications, escape routes and safety zones (LCES) will be coordinated for all personnel involved."
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The decision to construct a downhill/indirect handline should be made by a qualified supervisor after evaluating the situation. The crew must be able to rapidly reach a safety zone from any point along the line if the fire unexpectedly crosses below them.
2 Supervisors and fire fighters should look for and avoid the "WATCHOUT SITUATIONS" identified in the NWCG Fireline Handbook when deciding to construct a downhill/indirect handline. Four of the eighteen "WATCHOUT SITUATIONS" that are applicable to this incident are: "(11) Unburned fuel between you and the fire, (13) On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below, (15) Wind increases and/or changes direction, and (17) Terrain or fuels make escape to safety zones difficult." 2 It is important for fire fighters to readily recognize the following common denominators from past fatal events so that future tragedies can be prevented:
• Most incidents happen on smaller fires or on isolated portions of larger fires.
• Most fires are innocent in appearance before unexpected shifts in wind direction and/or speed result in flare-ups or extreme fire behavior. In some cases, tragedies occur in the mop-up stage.
• Flare-ups generally occur in deceptively light fuels, such as grass and light brush.
• Fires run uphill surprisingly fast in chimneys, saddles, gullies, and on steep slopes.
• Some suppression tools, such as helicopters or airtankers, can adversely affect fire behavior. The blasts of air from low-flying helicopters and airtankers have been known to cause flare-ups.
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Recommendation #: Fire departments and fire service agencies should ensure that officers establish an initial attack plan that allows for the fire to be fought aggressively, but provides for the protection and safety of fire fighters first.
Discussion: The NWCG Fireline Handbook's chapter on initial attack states "upon arrival, officers should immediately determine an initial attack plan. This should be done quickly and be based on the initial size-up of the fire. The intent is to get work started in suppressing the fire as soon as possible. The officer must first determine:
• The location of escape routes and safety zones.
• Good anchor points such as roads, burned area, rivers, etc.
• How to attack the fire (direct or indirect).
• Type of control line needed.
• When will the next units arrive?
• Additional resource needs.
• How will topography affect fire behavior?"
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The NWCG Fireline Handbook includes an initial safety checklist that should be completed and reviewed as needed or as conditions change. The safety checklist provides a list of questions that require a "yes" or "no" answer that the officer can utilize to ensure that all safety concerns have been addressed and mitigated. Some of the questions in the checklist include: "Do you have a current weather forecast and is it consistent with observed fire weather?", "Are lookouts in place?", "Are the standard fire orders being followed?", and "Do Discussion: LCES is a safety procedure put in place before fighting the fire. It is a self-triggering mechanism that functions sequentially: lookouts assess and reassess the fire environment; lookouts communicate safety threats to each fire fighter; and fire fighters use escape routes and move to safety zones.
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Identification of escape routes and safety zones is one of the primary responsibilities of any wildland fire fighter working on or near the fireline. The following guidelines can be used when selecting safety zones:
• Avoid locations that are downwind from the fire.
• Avoid locations that are in chimneys, saddles, or narrow canyons.
• Avoid locations that require a steep uphill escape route (greater than 50% slope).
• Take advantage of heat barriers such as lee side of ridges, large rocks, or solid structures.
• Burn out safety zones prior to flame front approach.
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The forest service road and the river were identified as the safety zones at this incident. These two sites were located uphill and downhill respectively on a hillside with a 90% slope. The victim and Fire Fighter #2 attempted to run up the hill in an attempt to reach the forest service road.
